Black Box LPB2910A User Manual page 81

Lpb2900 series gigabit managed poe+ switches
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Single   8 02.1X:  
In   p ort-­‐based   8 02.1X   a uthentication,   o nce   a   s upplicant   i s   s uccessfully   a uthenticated   o n   a   p ort,   t he  
whole   port   is   opened   for   network   traffic.   This   allows   other   clients   connected   to   the   port   (for  
instance   through   a   hub)   to   piggyback   on   the   successfully   authenticated   client   and   get   network  
access   even   though   they   really   aren't   authenticated.   To   overcome   this   security   breach,   use   the  
Single  802.1X  variant.  Single  802.1X  is  really  not  an  IEEE  standard,  but  features  many  of  the  same  
characteristics   as   the   port-­‐based   802.1X.   In   Single   802.1X,   at   most   one   supplicant   can   get  
authenticated   on   the   port   at   a   time.   Normal   EAPOL   frames   are   used   in   the   communication  
between   t he   s upplicant   a nd   t he   s witch.   I f   m ore   t han   o ne   s upplicant   i s   c onnected   t o   a   p ort,   t he   o ne  
that  comes  first  when  the  port's  link  comes  up  will  be  the  first  one  considered.  If  that  supplicant  
doesn't   provide   valid   credentials   within   a   certain   amount   of   time,   another   supplicant   will   get   a  
chance.   O nce   a   s upplicant   i s   s uccessfully   a uthenticated,   o nly   t hat   s upplicant   w ill   b e   a llowed   a ccess.  
This  is  the  most  secure  of  all  the  supported  modes.  In  this  mode,  the  Port  Security  module  is  used  
to   s ecure   a   s upplicant's   M AC   a ddress   o nce   s uccessfully   a uthenticated.    
Multi   8 02.1X:  
In   p ort-­‐based   8 02.1X   a uthentication,   o nce   a   s upplicant   i s   s uccessfully   a uthenticated   o n   a   p ort,   t he  
whole   port   is   opened   for   network   traffic.   This   allows   other   clients   connected   to   the   port   (for  
instance   through   a   hub)   to   piggyback   on   the   successfully   authenticated   client   and   get   network  
access   even   though   they   really   aren't   authenticated.   To   overcome   this   security   breach,   use   the  
Multi   8 02.1X   v ariant.  
Multi  802.1X  is  really  not  an  IEEE  standard,  but  features  many  of  the  same  characteristics  as  does  
port-­‐based  802.1X.  Multi  802.1X  is—  like  Single  802.1X—not  an  IEEE  standard,  but  a  variant  that  
features   many   of   the   same   characteristics.   In   Multi   802.1X,   one   or   more   supplicants   can   get  
authenticated   o n   t he   s ame   p ort   a t   t he   s ame   t ime.   E ach   s upplicant   i s   a uthenticated   i ndividually   a nd  
secured   i n   t he   M AC   t able   u sing   t he   P ort   S ecurity   m odule.  
In   Multi   802.1X,   it   is   not   possible   to   use   the   multicast   BPDU   MAC   address   as   destination   MAC  
address  for  EAPOL  frames  sent  from  the  switch  towards  the  supplicant,  since  that  would  cause  all  
supplicants   a ttached   t o   t he   p ort   t o   r eply   t o   r equests   s ent   f rom   t he   s witch.   I nstead,   t he   s witch   u ses  
the   supplicant's   MAC   address,   which   is   obtained   from   the   first   EAPOL   Start   or   EAPOL   Response  
Identity  frame  sent  by  the  supplicant.  An  exception  to  this  is  when  no  supplicants  are  attached.  In  
this  case,  the  switch  sends  EAPOL  Request  Identity  frames  using  the  BPDU  multicast  MAC  address  
as   d estination—   t o   w ake   u p   a ny   s upplicants   t hat   m ight   b e   o n   t he   p ort.  
The   maximum   number   of   supplicants   that   can   be   attached   to   a   port   can   be   limited   using   Port  
Security   L imit   C ontrol.    
MAC-­‐based   A uth.:  
Unlike   p ort-­‐based   8 02.1X,   M AC-­‐based   a uthentication   i s   n ot   a   s tandard,   b ut   m erely   a   b est-­‐practices  
method   adopted   by   the   industry.   In   MAC-­‐based   authentication,   users   are   called   clients,   and   the  
switch   acts   as   the   supplicant   on   behalf   of   clients.   The   initial   frame   (any   kind   of   frame)   sent   by   a  
client   i s   s nooped   b y   t he   s witch,   w hich   i n   t urn   u ses   t he   c lient's   M AC   a ddress   a s   b oth   u sername   a nd  
password   in   the   subsequent   EAP   exchange   with   the   RADIUS   server.   The   6-­‐byte   MAC   address   is  
converted   t o   a   s tring   i n   t he   f orm   " xx-­‐xx-­‐xx-­‐xx-­‐xx-­‐xx",   t hat   i s,   a   d ash   ( -­‐)   i s   u sed   a s   s eparator   b etween  
the   lower-­‐cased   hexadecimal   digits.   The   switch   only   supports   the   MD5-­‐Challenge   authentication  
method,   s o   t he   R ADIUS   s erver   m ust   b e   c onfigured   a ccordingly.  
When   a uthentication   i s   c omplete,   t he   R ADIUS   s erver   s ends   a   s uccess   o r   f ailure   i ndication,   w hich   i n  
turn  causes  the  switch  to  open  up  or  block  traffic  for  that  particular  client,  using  the  Port  Security  
module.   Only   then   will   frames   from   the   client   be   forwarded   on   the   switch.   There   are   no   EAPOL  
frames   i nvolved   i n   t his   a uthentication,   a nd   t herefore   M AC-­‐based   A uthentication   h as   n othing   t o   d o  
with   t he   8 02.1X   s tandard.  
The  advantage  of  MAC-­‐based  authentication  over  port-­‐based  802.1X  is  that  several  clients  can  be  
connected  to  the  same  port  (e.g.,  through  a  3rd  party  switch  or  a  hub)  and  still  require  individual  
authentication,   and   that   the   clients   don't   need   special   supplicant   software   to   authenticate.   The  
advantage   o f   M AC-­‐based   a uthentication   o ver   8 02.1X-­‐based   a uthentication   i s   t hat   t he   c lients   d on't  
need  special  supplicant  software  to  authenticate.  The  disadvantage  is  that  MAC  addresses  can  be  
spoofed   b y   m alicious   u sers—equipment   w hose   M AC   a ddress   i s   a   v alid   R ADIUS   u ser   c an   b e   u sed   b y  
anyone.  Also,  only  the  MD5-­‐Challenge  method  is  supported.  The  maximum  number  of  clients  that  
can   b e   a ttached   t o   a   p ort   c an   b e   l imited   u sing   t he   P ort   S ecurity   L imit   C ontrol   f unctionality.    
69
Publication date: Sept, 2015
Revision A1

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