Belkin® Secure DVI KVM Switch, Secure KM Switch and
Secure Windowing KVM EAL 4 augmented ALC_FLR.3 Security Target
6.1.2.2 FMT_MSA.3
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FMT_MSA.3.1
Application Note: On start‐up, one and only one attached COMPUTER shall be selected.
FMT_MSA.3.2
6.1.3 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF
6.1.3.1 FPT_PHP.1
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FPT_PHP.1.1
FPT_PHP.1.2
6.1.3.2 FPT_PHP.3
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FPT_PHP.3.1
Static attribute initialization
No other components.
FMT_MSA.1 Management of Security Attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
The TSF shall enforce the Data Separation SFP to provide
restrictive default values for security attributes that are used to
enforce the SFP.
The TSF shall allow the None to specify alternative initial values to
override the default values when an object or information is
created.
Passive detection of physical attack
No other components.
None
The TSF shall provide unambiguous detection of physical
tampering that might compromise the TSF.
The TSF shall provide the capability to determine whether physical
tampering with the TSF's devices or TSF's elements has occurred.
Resistance to physical attack
No other components.
FPT_PHP.1
FPT_PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist physical interference, such as
attempts to open the TOE enclosure to the TOE exterior by
responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.
Rev. 1.01
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