Belkin F1DN102C User Manual page 36

Belkin® Secure DVI KVM Switch, Secure KM Switch and
Secure Windowing KVM EAL 4 augmented ALC_FLR.3 Security Target
T.TAMPER
An unidentified threat
agent could physically
tamper with or modify
the TOE, allowing
unauthorized
information flows.
Table 7 – TOE Security Objectives rationale
O.UNIDIR
TOE circuitry shall assure that USER
KEYBOARD, USER POINTING DEVICE
and EDID data will flow only from
PERIPHERAL DEVICES
SWITCHED COUPLED COMPUTER.
O.TAMPER
The TOE Device
unambiguous detection of physical
tampering of the TSF's devices or
TSF's enclosure, and to permanently
disables TOE normal functionality
after such an event.
O.TAMPER
The TOE Device
unambiguous detection of physical
tampering of the TSF's devices or
TSF's enclosure, and permanently
disables TOE normal functionality
after such an event.
been altered.
O.UNIDIR
This objective will ensure that
console
POINTING DEVICE data will only
flow through the TOE in one
to the
direction
DEVICES to the SWITCHED
COUPLED COMPUTER, thereby
preventing data transfer from
connected
NETWORKS
devices.
O.TAMPER
Tampering of the TOE may cause
data to be transferred between
provides
COMPUTERS. Detection of a
physical tampering attempt may
prevent such an event, or will
permanently disable the TOE
after detection of such event.
O.TAMPER
provides The TOE contains mechanisms
that provide
indication
tampering attempt that might
compromise
permanently disable the TOE
after such an event.
Rev. 1.01
KEYBOARD and
from PERIPHERAL
COMPUTERS or
to peripheral
unambiguous
of a physical
the TSF, and
Page | 36