Threats Addressed By The Toe - Belkin F1DN102C User Manual

Belkin® Secure DVI KVM Switch, Secure KM Switch and
Secure Windowing KVM EAL 4 augmented ALC_FLR.3 Security Target
4. An unidentified threat agent attacking the TOE and/or its coupled PERIPHERALS.
3.2.1 Threats Addressed by the TOE
"Threats to Security" Section 3.2 of the claimed Protection Profile identifies the following
threats to the assets against which specific protection within the TOE is required:
Threat Definition
T.INVALIDUSB The AUTHORIZED USER will connect UNAUTHORIZED USB devices to the peripheral
switch.
T.RESIDUAL RESIDUAL DATA may be transferred between PERIPHERAL PORT GROUPS with different
IDs.
T.ROM_PROG The TSF may be modified by an attacker such that code embedded in reprogrammable
ROMs is overwritten, thus leading to a compromise of the separation‐enforcing
components of the code and subsequent compromise of the data flowing through the
TOE or the NETWORKS connected to its coupled COMPUTERS.
T.SPOOF Via intentional or unintentional actions, a USER may think the set of SHARED
PERIPHERALS are currently CONNECTED to one COMPUTER when in fact they are
connected to a different one.
T.TRANSFER A CONNECTION, via the TOE, between COMPUTERS may allow information transfer.
T.TAMPER An unidentified threat agent could physically tamper with or modify the TOE, allowing
unauthorized information flows.
T.INFECTED TOE may be attacked by a coupled COMPUTER that was infected by malicious code
that causes the TOE to change its functionality and compromise the data flowing
through the TOE to the NETWORKS connected to its coupled COMPUTERS.
T.PERIP A USER may connect to the TOE a qualified PERIPHERAL DEVICE that has a security
vulnerability which allows the transfer of USER or NETWORK information through the
coupled TOE, thereby violating the confidentiality of information.
Table 3 – Threats addressed by the TOE
Rev. 1.01
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