Belkin® Secure DVI KVM Switch, Secure KM Switch and
Secure Windowing KVM EAL 4 augmented ALC_FLR.3 Security Target
3
Security Problem Definition
This section describes assumptions about the operational environment in which the TOE is
intended to be used and represents the conditions for the secure operation of the TOE.
Note: The content in this section is appears in the Security Problem Definition of the claimed
PSS PP and is copied here for completeness.
3.1 Secure Usage Assumptions
The Security Objectives and Security Functional Requirements defined in subsequent sections
of this Security Target are based on the condition that all of the assumptions described in this
section are satisfied.
Assumption
A.ACCESS
A.MANAGE
A.NOEVIL
A.PHYSICAL
Table 2 – Secure usage assumptions
3.2 Threats
The assets under attack are one or more of the following:
1. The information that is transiting the TOE (e.g. information typed by the user on user
keyboard).
2. The information that is residing in networks connected to the COMPUTERS that are
coupled to the TOE (e.g. the risk of data leakages across the TOE between coupled
isolated networks).
3. The integrity of the networks coupled to the COMPUTERS that are coupled to the TOE
(e.g. the risk of network attacks or DoS on coupled networks from TOE).
In general, the threat agent may be one or more of:
1. People with TOE access (who are expected to possess "average" expertise, few
resources, and moderate motivation).
2. Failure of the TOE or PERIPHERALS.
3. Infected COMPUTERS or NETWORKS coupled to the TOE.
Definition
An AUTHORIZED USER possesses the necessary privileges to access the
information transferred by the TOE. USERS are AUTHORIZED USERS.
The TOE is installed and managed in accordance with the manufacturer's
directions.
The AUTHORIZED USER is non‐hostile and follows all usage guidance.
The TOE is physically secure.
Rev. 1.01
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