To Be Performed Periodically By Competent Persons - Leuze electronic MLC 520 EX Series Original Operating Instructions

Safety light curtains

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Table Of Contents

Table of Contents

Check:

Are both safety-related switching outputs (OSSDs) integrated in the downstream

machine control acc. to the required safety category?

Are switching elements that are controlled by the safety sensor monitored

according to the required safety level (PL, SIL, category) (e.g., contactors

through EDM)?

Are all points of operation near the safety sensor accessible only through the

protective field of the safety sensor?

Are the necessary additional protective devices in the immediate surroundings

(e.g., safety guard) properly mounted and secured against tampering?

If it is possible to be present undetected between the safety sensor and point of

operation: is an assigned start/restart interlock functional?

Is the command device for unlocking the start/restart interlock mounted in such a

way that it cannot be reached from within the danger zone and so that the com-

plete danger zone can be seen from the installation location?

Has the maximum stopping time of the machine been measured and docu-

mented?

Is the required safety distance maintained?

Does interruption with a test object intended for this purpose cause the danger-

ous movement(s) to stop?

Is the safety sensor effective during the entire dangerous movement(s)?

Is the safety sensor effective in all relevant operating modes of the machine?

Is start-up of dangerous movements reliably prevented if an active light beam or

the protective field is interrupted with a test object intended for this purpose?

Was the sensor detection capacity successfully tested (see table 9.2)?

Were distances to reflective surfaces taken into account during configuration and

no reflection bypasses subsequently detected?

Are notices for regular testing of the safety sensor legible to the operator and are

they located in a highly visible location?

Are changes to the safety function (e.g.: muting, blanking, protective field swi-

tchover) not easy to achieve through tampering?

Are settings that could result in an unsafe state possible only by means of key,

password or tool?

Are there incentives that pose stimulus for tampering?

Were the operators instructed prior to starting work?

a) not applicable

9.2