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IOGear GCS1412TAA4C Manual

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IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch Series (CAC Models)
Security Target
Version 1.1
2022-03-08
Prepared for:
15365 Barranca Pkwy,
Irvine, CA 92618
Prepared by:
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
6841 Benjamin Franklin Drive
Columbia, Maryland 21046

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Summary of Contents for IOGear GCS1412TAA4C

  • Page 1 IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch Series (CAC Models) Security Target Version 1.1 2022-03-08 Prepared for: 15365 Barranca Pkwy, Irvine, CA 92618 Prepared by: Common Criteria Testing Laboratory 6841 Benjamin Franklin Drive Columbia, Maryland 21046...
  • Page 2 Security Target Version 1.1 2022-03-08 Revision History Version Author Modifications Leidos Initial Version Leidos Updates based on vendor and evaluation reviews Leidos Updates for validator check-in comments Leidos Minor Updates for evaluator comments Leidos Updates for validator check-out comments...

  • Page 3: Table Of Contents

    Security Target Version 1.1 2022-03-08 Table of Contents Security Target Introduction ......................... 1 Security Target, Target of Evaluation, and Common Criteria Identification ........1 Conformance Claims ........................2 Conventions ............................ 3 1.3.1 Terminology ..........................3 1.3.2 Acronyms ..........................5 TOE Description ............................ 6 Product Overview ...........................
  • Page 4 Security Target Version 1.1 2022-03-08 6.2.1 FDP_AFL_EXT.1 – Audio Filtration ..................34 6.2.2 FDP_APC_EXT.1 (All Iterations); FDP_UDF_EXT.1/AO – Unidirectional Data Flow (Audio Output); FDP_UDF_EXT.1/KM – Unidirectional Data Flow (Keyboard/Mouse); FDP_UAI_EXT.1 User Authentication Isolation; FDP_UDF_EXT.1/VI – Unidirectional Data Flow (Video Output); ....34 6.2.3 FDP_CDS_EXT.1 –...
  • Page 5 List of Figures and Tables Figure 1: Simplified Block Diagram of a 2-Port KVM TOE ................9 Figure 2: Representative IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch TOE Model in its environment ......11 Table 1: IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch TOE Models (with CAC) ..............1 Table 2: Terms and Definitions ........................

  • Page 6: Security Target Introduction

    Security Target Introduction This section identifies the Security Target (ST) and Target of Evaluation (TOE) identification, ST conventions, ST conformance claims, and the ST organization. The TOE is IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch Series (CAC Models) provided by IOGEAR. The Security Target contains the following additional sections: •...

  • Page 7: Conformance Claims

    Security Target Version 1.1 2022-03-08 Conformance Claims This ST and the TOE it describes are conformant to the following CC specifications: • Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security Functional Components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017 o Part 2 Extended •...

  • Page 8: Conventions

    Security Target Version 1.1 2022-03-08 • TD0506 – Missing Steps to Disconnect and Reconnect Display Display Conventions The Security Functional Requirements included in this section are derived from Part 2 of the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 5, with additional extended functional components.
  • Page 9 Security Target Version 1.1 2022-03-08 Term Definition A computing device connected to a PSD. May be a personal computer, server, Connected Computer tablet, or any other computing device. Connected Peripheral A Peripheral that is connected to a PSD. A physical or logical conduit that enables Devices to interact through respective Connection interfaces.

  • Page 10: Acronyms

    Security Target Version 1.1 2022-03-08 Term Definition TOE Security Functionality The combined hardware, software, and firmware capabilities of a TOE that are (TSF) responsible for implementation of its claimed SFRs. TOE Security Functionality Any external interface between the TOE and its Operational Environment that has Interface (TSFI) a security‐relevant purpose or is used to transmit security‐relevant data.

  • Page 11: Toe Description

    TOE Overview The TOE is the IOGEAR Secure Switch series of products with CAC. The TOE allows users to connect a single set of peripherals to its console ports to interact with multiple computers that are connected to it via its computer ports.
  • Page 12 The tables below identify the interfaces of the Secure KVM console and computer ports according to model number. Table 4: IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch Console Interfaces and TOE Models Console Video Output Console...
  • Page 13 • • • • GCS1218TAA4C • • • • • GCS1228TAA4C Table 5: IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch Computer Interfaces and TOE Models Computer Video Input Computer Computer Audio Computer CAC Interface Keyboard / Mouse Input Input Model No. 3.5mm Analog...
  • Page 14 Version 1.1 2022-03-08 The IOGEAR Secure KVM products implement a secure isolation design for all models to share a single set of peripheral components. Each peripheral has its own dedicated data path. USB keyboard and mouse peripherals are filtered and emulated. The USB authentication device connection is on a separate circuit from the keyboard and mouse and, after filtering for qualification, has a direct connection path to the selected computer.

  • Page 15: Physical Boundary

    The IOGEAR Port Authentication Utility must be installed on a separate secure source computer using an installation wizard. The utility supports Microsoft Windows 8 and higher. The Port Authentication Utility computer connects to the TOE via USB connection to Computer Port 1.

  • Page 16: Logical Boundary

    Figure 2: Representative IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch TOE Model in its environment The IOGEAR Secure KVM devices do not include any wireless interfaces. The IOGEAR Secure KVM devices have been tested and found to comply with the radio frequency emissions limits for a Class A digital device, pursuant to Part 15 of the Federal Communications Commission rules.

  • Page 17: Security Audit

    Security Target Version 1.1 2022-03-08 2.4.1 Security Audit The TOE generates audit records for the authorized administrator actions. Each audit record records a standard set of information such as date and time of the event, type of event, and the outcome (success or failure) of the event.

  • Page 18: Toe Access

    • IOGEAR Single/Dual View Secure KVM Switch User Manual 2/4/8-Port USB DVI/HDMI/DisplayPort, Version 1.03, 2021-5-5 • IOGEAR 2/4/8-Port USB DVI/HDMI/DisplayPort Single/ View Secure KVM Switch Admin Log Audit Code, Version 1.03, 2021-5-5 TOE Documentation: • PP4.0 Secure KVM Isolation Document, Version 1.1 (Proprietary) o Note: The PP4.0 Secure KVM Isolation Document is proprietary as permitted by PSD 4.0 Annex...

  • Page 19: Security Problem Definition

    In general, the [PSD] has presented a Security Problem Definition appropriate for peripheral sharing devices. The IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch Series supports KVM (USB Keyboard/Mouse, analog audio (out), DisplayPort, DVI-I and HDMI video) peripheral switch functionality by combining a 2/4/8 port KVM switch, an audio output port, and a USB authentication device (CAC port and smart card).

  • Page 20: Security Objectives

    Security Target Version 1.1 2022-03-08 Security Objectives Like the Security Problem Definition, this Security Target includes by reference the Security Objectives from the [PSD], [MOD-VI_V1.0], [MOD_AO_V1.0], [MOD_KM_V1.0], and [MOD_UA_V1.0]. The [PSD], [MOD_AO_V1.0], and [MOD-VI_V1.0] security objectives for the operational environment are reproduced below, since these objectives characterize technical and procedural measures each consumer must implement in their operational environment.

  • Page 21: Security Requirements

    Security Target Version 1.1 2022-03-08 IT Security Requirements This section defines the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) and Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) that serve to represent the security functional claims for the Target of Evaluation (TOE) and to scope the evaluation effort. The SFRs have all been drawn from the Protection Profile: [PSD] and the modules: [MOD_AO_V1.0], [MOD_KM_V1.0], [MOD_UA_V1.0], and [MOD-VI_V1.0], and include some of the optional and selection- based SFRs.

  • Page 22: Toe Security Functional Requirements (Psd, Mod_Ao_V1.0, Mod_Km_V1.0, Mod_Ua_V1.0)

    Security Target Version 1.1 2022-03-08 • FDP_SWI_EXT.1 – PSD Switching • FDP_SWI_EXT.2 – PSD Switching Methods • FDP_SWI_EXT.3 – Tied Switching • FDP_TER_EXT.1 – Session Termination • FDP_TER_EXT.2 – Session Termination of Removed Devices • FDP_TER_EXT.3 – Session Termination Upon Switching •...
  • Page 23 Security Target Version 1.1 2022-03-08 Requirement Class Requirement Component FDP_PDC_EXT.2/KM – Authorized Devices (Keyboard/Mouse) FDP_PDC_EXT.2/VI – Peripheral Device Connection (Video Output) FDP_PDC_EXT.2/UA – Authorized Devices (User Authentication Devices) FDP_PDC_EXT.3/KM – Authorized Connection Protocols (Keyboard/Mouse) FDP_PDC_EXT.4 – Supported Authentication Device FDP_PUD_EXT.1 – Powering Unauthorized Devices FDP_PWR_EXT.1 Powered By Computer FDP_RIP.1/KM –...

  • Page 24: Security Audit (Fau)

    Security Target Version 1.1 2022-03-08 Requirement Class Requirement Component FPT_NTA_EXT.1 – No Access to TOE FPT_PHP.1 – Passive Detection of Physical Attack FPT_PHP.3 – Resistance to Physical Attack FPT_STM.1 Reliable Time Stamps FPT_TST.1 – TSF Testing FPT_TST_EXT.1 – TSF Testing FTA: TOE Access FTA_CIN_EXT.1 –...
  • Page 25 Security Target Version 1.1 2022-03-08 Frequency (kHz) Minimum Attenuation (dB) Maximum Voltage After Attenuation 23.9 127.65 mV 26.4 95.73 mV 30.8 57.68 mV 35.0 35.57 mV 38.8 22.96 mV 43.0 14.15 mV 46.0 10.02 mV 71.4 0.53 mV 71.4 0.53 mV 71.4 0.53 mV 71.4...
  • Page 26 Security Target Version 1.1 2022-03-08 FDP_APC_EXT.1.2/UA The TSF shall ensure that no data or electrical signals flow between connected computers whether the TOE is powered on or powered off. FDP_APC_EXT.1.3/UA The TSF shall ensure that no data transits the TOE when the TOE is powered off. FDP_APC_EXT.1.4/UA The TSF shall that no data transits the TOE when the TOE is in a failure state Application Note: This SFR is originally defined in the Base-PP but is refined and iterated to apply...
  • Page 27 Security Target Version 1.1 2022-03-08 FDP_FIL_EXT.1.3/UA The TSF shall consider all [PSD UA] whitelisted devices as authorized devices for [user authentication device] interfaces in peripheral device connections only if they are not on the [PSD UA] blacklist or otherwise unauthorized. 5.2.2.9 Peripheral Device Connection (FDP_PDC_EXT.1) FDP_PDC_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall reject connections with unauthorized devices upon TOE power up...
  • Page 28 Security Target Version 1.1 2022-03-08 5.2.2.11 Authorized Devices (Keyboard/Mouse) (FDP_PDC_EXT.2/KM) FDP_PDC_EXT.2.1/KM The TSF shall allow connections with authorized devices and functions as defined in [Appendix E of the KM Module] and [ • ‐ authorized devices as defined in the PP Module for Audio Output Devices, •...
  • Page 29 Security Target Version 1.1 2022-03-08 • authorized devices presenting authorized interface protocols as ‐ defined in the PP Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices, • authorized devices presenting authorized interface protocols as ‐ defined in the PP Module for Video/Display Devices, ] upon TOE power up and upon connection of a peripheral device to a powered- on TOE.
  • Page 30 Security Target Version 1.1 2022-03-08 5.2.2.16 Powering Unauthorized Devices (FDP_PUD_EXT.1) FDP_PUD_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall not provide power to any unauthorized device connected to the analog audio peripheral interface. 5.2.2.17 Powered By Computer (FDP_PWR_EXT.1) FDP_PWR_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall not be powered by a connected computer. 5.2.2.18 Residual Information Protection (Keyboard Data) (FDP_RIP.1/KM) FDP_RIP.1.1/KM The TSF shall ensure that any keyboard data in volatile memory is purged upon...

  • Page 31: Identification And Authentication (Fia)

    Security Target Version 1.1 2022-03-08 5.2.2.25 Session Termination of Removed Devices (FDP_TER_EXT.2) FDP_TER_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall terminate an open session upon removal of the user authentication device. 5.2.2.26 Session Termination upon Switching (FDP_TER_EXT.3) FDP_TER_EXT.3.1 The TSF shall terminate an open session upon switching to a different computer. FDP_TER_EXT.3.2 The TSF shall reset the power to the user authentication device for at least one second upon switching to a different computer.

  • Page 32: Security Management (Fmt)

    Security Target Version 1.1 2022-03-08 5.2.4 Security Management (FMT) 5.2.4.1 Management of Security Functions Behavior (FMT_MOF.1) FMT_MOF.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to [modify the behavior of] the functions [TOE user authentication device filtering whitelist and blacklist, TOE keyboard and mouse filtering blacklist, Reset to Factory Default, view audit logs, change password] to [the authorized administrators].

  • Page 33: Toe Access (Fta)

    Security Target Version 1.1 2022-03-08 the anti‐tamper battery] to the [TOE enclosure and any remote controllers] by the attacked component becoming permanently disabled. 5.2.5.5 Reliable Time Stamps (FPT_STM.1) FPT_STM.1.1 The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps. 5.2.5.6 TSF Testing (FPT_TST.1) FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self‐tests [during initial start‐up and at the conditions [upon reset button activation]] to demonstrate the correct operation of [user...

  • Page 34: Toe Security Functional Requirements (Dp Models)

    TOE Security Functional Requirements (DP Models) The following table identifies the [MOD-VI_V1.0] SFRs that are satisfied by DP Models, which include the following: • GCS1412TAA4C, • GCS1414TAA4C, • GCS1418TAA4C, •...

  • Page 35: Toe Security Functional Requirements (H Models)

    Security Target Version 1.1 2022-03-08 5.3.1.3 Sub-Protocol Rules (DisplayPort Protocol) (DP Models) FDP_SPR_EXT.1/DP(DP)) FDP_SPR_EXT.1.1/DP(DP) The TSF shall apply the following rules for the [DisplayPort] protocol: • block the following video/display sub‐protocols: o [CEC, o EDID from computer to display, o HDCP, o MCCS] •...

  • Page 36: Toe Security Functional Requirements (D Models)

    Security Target Version 1.1 2022-03-08 • block the following video/display sub‐protocols: o [ARC, o CEC, o EDID from computer to display, o HDCP, o HEAC, o HEC, o MCCS] • allow the following video/display sub‐protocols: o [EDID from display to computer, o HPD from display to computer].

  • Page 37: Toe Security Assurance Requirements

    Security Target Version 1.1 2022-03-08 5.5.1.2 Sub‐Protocol Rules (DVI‐I Protocol) (D Models) (FDP_SPR_EXT.1/DVI-I(D)) FDP_SPR_EXT.1.1/DVI-I(D) The TSF shall apply the following rules for the [DVI‐I] protocol: • block the following video/display sub‐protocols: o [ARC, o CEC, o EDID from computer to display, o HDCP, o HEAC, o HEC,...

  • Page 38: Toe Summary Specification

    • peripheral device acceptance, • button jam test failure, and • all passing self-tests. During normal operation, the TOE provides administrator access to all audit records. IOGEAR's assistance is required to read audit records from an inoperable switch.

  • Page 39: User Data Protection

    Security Target Version 1.1 2022-03-08 The logs are stored on EEPROM on the KVM PCBoard component of the TOE. The logs can be extracted by the authorized administrator by entering Administrator Logon mode, logging on, and then issuing the command [LIST]. The TOE extracts the log data and displays them using the text editor. The administrator can view the logs but cannot erase or delete any of the information.

  • Page 40: Fdp_Cds_Ext.1 - Connected Displays Supported

    Because of this, the single selected source video feed is always the same channel and indication of the selected channel is through the channel selection LEDs on the TOE chassis. The DisplayPort models GCS1412TAA4C, GCS1414TAA4C, and GCS1418TAA4C each support one connected display. While GCS1422TAA4C, GCS1424TAA4C, and GCS1428TAA4C each support two connected displays at a time.

  • Page 41: Fdp_Fil_Ext.1/Ua - Device Filtering (User Authentication Devices)

    Security Target Version 1.1 2022-03-08 by both Keyboard/ Mouse Ports. The Reset KVM to Default function will clear the blacklist created by the Secure KVM administrator functions. The TOE emulates data from authorized USB Keyboard and Mouse protocol interfaces to USB connected computers.
  • Page 42 Security Target Version 1.1 2022-03-08 If a device is blacklisted in Administrator-defined list, the device will be rejected even if was by default whitelisted in Port Authentication Utility-defined list. If a device is assigned to both blacklist and whitelist (for example, by Administrator-defined black/whitelist), it will be defined as blacklisted and considered unauthorized.

  • Page 43: Fdp_Pud_Ext.1 - Powering Unauthorized Devices

    TOE. During KVM operation, non-standard keyboards with integrated USB hubs and/or other USB-integrated devices may not be fully supported due to the strict security standards and policy for the IOGEAR Secure KVM Switch. If supported, only basic (HID) keyboard operations will function.

  • Page 44: Fdp_Swi_Ext.1 - Psd Switching; Fdp_Swi_Ext.2 - Psd Switching Methods

    Security Target Version 1.1 2022-03-08 Administrator performs Reset to Factory Default, all settings previously configured by the Administrator (such as USB device whitelist/blacklist) will be cleaned and reset to factory default settings. Once the Reset to Factory Default function has been completed, the Secure KVM will terminate the Administrator Logon mode, purge keyboard/mouse buffer, and power cycle the Secure KVM automatically.

  • Page 45: Toe Video Security Function

    6.2.12.1 DP Models The following TOE models support DP 1.2 video input and output, and one or two displays. Table 14: DP Models Configuration 2-Port 4-Port 8-Port Single Head GCS1412TAA4C GCS1414TAA4C GCS1418TAA4C DisplayPort Dual Head GCS1422TAA4C GCS1424TAA4C GCS1428TAA4C These models accept DisplayPort for the computer video display interface. The TOE will convert the DP signal to HDMI inside the TOE and then back to DisplayPort for output to the console display(s).
  • Page 46 Security Target Version 1.1 2022-03-08 • FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI(DP)- Authorized Connection Protocols (Video Output) (DP Model) • FDP_SPR_EXT.1/DP(DP) – Sub-Protocol Rules (DisplayPort Protocol) (DP Module) 6.2.12.2 H Models The following TOE models support HDMI video input/output, and one or two displays. Table 15: H Models Configuration 2-Port 4-Port...

  • Page 47: Identification And Authentication (Fia_Uau.2/ Fia_Uid.2)

    Security Target Version 1.1 2022-03-08 Identification and Authentication (FIA_UAU.2/ FIA_UID.2) Authentication is required to perform administrator functions such as configuring the user authentication device filtering (i.e. CDF) whitelist and blacklist. The authorized administrator is identified and authenticated through the logon function. The authorized administrator logs on by entering the Administrator Logon mode as described in the administrator guide and providing a valid password.

  • Page 48: Fmt_Smr.1 - Security Roles

    Security Target Version 1.1 2022-03-08 The TOE provides a security management function to Reset to Factory Default (not to be confused with the front panel reset button). When a successfully authenticated authorized Administrator performs Reset to Factory Default, settings previously configured by the Administrator (such as USB device whitelist/blacklist) will be cleaned and reset to factory default settings.

  • Page 49: Fpt_Nta_Ext.1 - No Access To Toe

    TOE user and the guidance documentation instructs the user to stop using the TOE, remove it from service and contact IOGEAR. The KVM and RPS contain internal batteries with a minimum lifetime of five years, are non-replaceable, and cannot be accessed without opening the device enclosure.
  • Page 50 Security Target Version 1.1 2022-03-08 • Firmware integrity: the TOE validates the integrity of firmware by calculating the checksum of the firmware binary file and comparing to a pre-calculated value that is stored in the TOE. Upon a failure, the TOE will be in a failure state (permanently inoperable). •...

  • Page 51: Toe Access

    Security Target Version 1.1 2022-03-08 • For a Key stuck test failure, the front panel Port LED and CAC LED of that jammed button port will flash. • For all other Self-test failures (Firmware integrity, Accessibility of internal memory of the micro- controller, Computer interfaces isolation functionality, Anti-tampering mechanism) all front panel LEDs (except for Power LED) flash.
  • Page 52 Security Target Version 1.1 2022-03-08 The TOE supports connected displays from a single source video feed (either single-head or multi-head). Because of this, the single selected source video feed is always the same channel as all other peripherals, and indication of the selected channel is indicated through the channel selection LEDs on the TOE chassis. CAC reader LEDs (one per Port) are also located on the front panel (of the switch) and the far right of the upper bar on the panel (of the RPS) and provide a continuous visual indication of the status of the CAC function associated with that port.

  • Page 53: Protection Profile Claims

    Security Target Version 1.1 2022-03-08 Protection Profile Claims This ST is conformant to the Protection Profile [PSD], including the following optional and selection-based SFRs: FAU_GEN.1, FDP_RIP_EXT.2, FDP_SWI_EXT.2, FIA_UAU.2, FIA_UID.2, FMT_MOF.1, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1, FPT_PHP.3, FPT_STM.1, and FTA_CIN_EXT.1. The ST is also conformant to the following PP-Modules •...
  • Page 54 Security Target Version 1.1 2022-03-08 Requirement Class Requirement Component Source FDP_PDC_EXT.2/UA – Authorized Devices (User Authentication [MOD_UA_V1.0] Devices) FDP_PDC_EXT.2/VI – Peripheral Device Connection (Video Output) [MOD-VI_V1.0] FDP_PDC_EXT.3/KM – Authorized Connection Protocols [MOD_KM_V1.0] (Keyboard/Mouse) FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI(DP) – Authorized Connection Protocols (Video [MOD-VI_V1.0] Output) (DP Models) FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI(H) –...
  • Page 55 Security Target Version 1.1 2022-03-08 Requirement Class Requirement Component Source FMT: Security FMT_SMF.1 – Specification of Management Functions [PSD] Management FMT_SMR.1 – Security Roles [PSD] FPT: Protection of the FPT_FLS_EXT.1 – Failure with Preservation of Secure State [PSD] FPT_NTA_EXT.1 – No Access to TOE [PSD] FPT_PHP.1 –...

  • Page 56: Rationale

    Security Target Version 1.1 2022-03-08 Rationale This security target includes by reference the [PSD], [MOD_AO_V1.0], [MOD_KM_V1.0], [MOD_UA_V1.0], and [MOD-VI_V1.0] Security Problem Definitions, Security Objectives, and Security Assurance Requirements. The security target makes no additions to the [PSD] or listed modules assumptions. The [PSD] and listed module’s security functional requirements have been reproduced with the Protection Profile operations completed.
  • Page 57 Security Target Version 1.1 2022-03-08 Specifications FDP_PDC_EXT.2/UA FDP_PDC_EXT.2/VI FDP_PDC_EXT.3/KM FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI(DP) FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI(H) FDP_PDC_EXT.3/VI(D) FDP_PDC_EXT.4 FDP_PUD_EXT.1 FDP_PWR_EXT.1 FDP_RIP.1/KM FDP_RIP_EXT.1 FDP_RIP_EXT.2 FDP_SPR_EXT.1/DP(DP) FDP_SPR_EXT.1/DVI-I(D) FDP_SPR_EXT.1/HDMI(H) FDP_SWI_EXT.1 FDP_SWI_EXT.2 FDP_TER_EXT.1 FDP_TER_EXT.2 FDP_TER_EXT.3 FDP_UAI_EXT.1 FDP_UDF_EXT.1/AO FDP_UDF_EXT.1/KM FDP_UDF_EXT.1/VI FIA_UAU.2 FIA_UID.2 FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMR.1 FPT_FLS_EXT.1 FPT_NTA_EXT.1...
  • Page 58 Security Target Version 1.1 2022-03-08 Specifications FPT_PHP.1 FPT_PHP.3 FPT_STM.1 FPT_TST.1 FPT_TST_EXT.1 FTA_CIN_EXT.1...

  • Page 59: Appendix A Letter Of Volatility

    Security Target Version 1.1 2022-03-08 Appendix A Letter of Volatility Item Component type, Memory Memory Size Memory User Data Manufacturer, and Type Technology Part number System Controller Embedded Undisclosed Volatile May contain user data Host Controller ATEN SICG8021A Host Controller Embedded Undisclosed Volatile...
  • Page 60 Security Target Version 1.1 2022-03-08 ITE IT66354 Remarks (1) The Embedded RAM may contain user data. The Embedded RAM is cleared and user keyboard/mouse data is purged when the Secure KVM powers-off or power-cycles, after switching ports, after a KVM reset (reboot), or a trigger of the tamper-proof mechanism is detected.

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