Kyocera TASKalfa 3500i User Manual
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TASKalfa 3500i, TASKalfa 4500i, TASKalfa 5500i
Data Security Kit (E) Overseas Version Security Target
TASKalfa 3500i, TASKalfa 4500i,

TASKalfa 5500i

Data Security Kit (E)
Overseas Version
Security Target
Version 0.80
This document is a translation of the evaluated
and certified security target written in Japanese.
July 7, 2011
KYOCERA MITA Corporation
© 2011 KYOCERA MITA Corporation

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Summary of Contents for Kyocera TASKalfa 3500i

  • Page 1: Taskalfa 5500I

    TASKalfa 3500i, TASKalfa 4500i, TASKalfa 5500i Data Security Kit (E) Overseas Version Security Target TASKalfa 3500i, TASKalfa 4500i, TASKalfa 5500i Data Security Kit (E) Overseas Version Security Target Version 0.80 This document is a translation of the evaluated and certified security target written in Japanese.
  • Page 2: Revision History

    TASKalfa 3500i, TASKalfa 4500i, TASKalfa 5500i Data Security Kit (E) Overseas Version Security Target - Revision History - Date Version Content of revision Approver Drafter Nov. 01, 2010 0.50 - Newly drafted Sato Sone Apr. 21, 2011 0.60 - Updated of the information...
  • Page 3: Table Of Contents

    TASKalfa 3500i, TASKalfa 4500i, TASKalfa 5500i Data Security Kit (E) Overseas Version Security Target - TABLE OF CONTENTS - 1. ST INTRODUCTION ..........1 1.1. ST R ..........................1 EFERENCE 1.2. TOE R ..........................1 EFERENCE 1.3. TOE O ..........................1 VERVIEW 1.3.1...
  • Page 4 TASKalfa 3500i, TASKalfa 4500i, TASKalfa 5500i Data Security Kit (E) Overseas Version Security Target 5. EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION ....14 6. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ......... 15 6.1. TOE S ................. 15 ECURITY UNCTIONAL EQUIREMENTS 6.2. TOE S ................. 18 ECURITY SSURANCE EQUIREMENTS 6.3.
  • Page 5 TASKalfa 3500i, TASKalfa 4500i, TASKalfa 5500i Data Security Kit (E) Overseas Version Security Target - List of Figures - 1.1 A ..................... 2 IGURE COMMON USAGE IN OFFICES 1.2 P TOE..................4 IGURE HYSICAL ONFIGURATION OF THE 1.3 L TOE ..................5...
  • Page 6 TASKalfa 3500i, TASKalfa 4500i, TASKalfa 5500i Data Security Kit (E) Overseas Version Security Target - List of Tables - 1.1 TOE C ......................3 ABLE OMPATIBLE RODUCTS 1.2 E ......................7 ABLE VALUATED EB BROWSER 1.3 G TOE....................8 ABLE UIDANCE THAT COMPOSES 4.1 C...
  • Page 7: St Introduction

    Printer (hereinafter referred to as “MFP”) having mainly copy function, scan function and print function, and ASIC having the security algorithm function. The TOE is installed to be used for the MFPs manufactured by KYOCERA MITA Corporation, namely, “TASKalfa 3500i, TASKalfa 4500i, TASKalfa 5500i, TASKalfa 3500iG, TASKalfa 4500iG, TASKalfa 5500iG, CS 3500i, CS 4500i, CS 5500i, CD 1435, CD 1445, CD 1455, DC 2435, DC 2445, DC 2455”.
  • Page 8: Required Non-Toe Hardware/Software/Firmware

    Figure 1.1 A common usage in offices The TOE security functions can activate upon agreement and registration of the license of the optional “Data Security Kit (E)” for the MFP “TASKalfa 3500i, TASKalfa 4500i, TASKalfa 5500i, TASKalfa 3500iG, TASKalfa 4500iG, TASKalfa 5500iG, CS 3500i, CS 4500i, CS 5500i, CD 1435, CD 1445, CD 1455, DC 2435, DC 2445, DC 2455”.
  • Page 9: Toe Description

    Service Person: A person certified by KYOCERA MITA Corporation as a service person of the MFP in which the TOE is installed. When the service person installs the TOE, she/he activates and setups (enables operation of) the TOE. Also, she/he performs maintenance of devices comprising the MFP in which the TOE is installed, as well as the TOE.
  • Page 10: Physical Configuration Of The Toe

    TASKalfa 3500i, TASKalfa 4500i, TASKalfa 5500i Data Security Kit (E) Overseas Version Security Target 1.4.2. Physical Configuration of the TOE The conceptual figure of physical configuration of the TOE is shown in Figure 1.2. Product User Product User Product User...
  • Page 11: Logical Configuration Of The Toe

    TASKalfa 3500i, TASKalfa 4500i, TASKalfa 5500i Data Security Kit (E) Overseas Version Security Target the controller firmware. Non-TOE is: the MFP identified by the table 1.1, language file used for performing user interface function and application software installed on the solution platform.
  • Page 12 TASKalfa 3500i, TASKalfa 4500i, TASKalfa 5500i Data Security Kit (E) Overseas Version Security Target Administrator Authentication Function A function that identifies and authenticates a machine administrator by a password of the machine administrator inputted from the operation panel. However, this function is not the security function that is provided by the TOE.
  • Page 13: Guidance

    TASKalfa 3500i, TASKalfa 4500i, TASKalfa 5500i Data Security Kit (E) Overseas Version Security Target Table 1.2 Evaluated Web browser Web browsers supported by TOE Evaluated Web browser - Microsoft Internet Explorer 7 or later - Microsoft Internet Explorer 8.0 - Mozilla FireFox 3.5 or later - Safari 4.0 or later...
  • Page 14: Assets Protected By The Toe

    TASKalfa 3500i, TASKalfa 4500i, TASKalfa 5500i Data Security Kit (E) Overseas Version Security Target Table 1.3 Guidance that composes TOE Type Name Version Destination User Data Security Kit (E) Operation Guide Rev.3 2011.3 Overseas Manual Notice 303MS56320 Overseas 2011.5 Data Security Kit (E) Operation Guide Set-up...
  • Page 15: Conformance Claims

    TASKalfa 3500i, TASKalfa 4500i, TASKalfa 5500i Data Security Kit (E) Overseas Version Security Target 2. CONFORMANCE CLAIMS 2.1. CC Conformance Claims This ST and TOE conform to the following evaluation standards for information security (CC): Part 1: Introduction and general model July 2009, Version 3.1 Revision 3 Final version...
  • Page 16: Security Problem Definition

    TASKalfa 3500i, TASKalfa 4500i, TASKalfa 5500i Data Security Kit (E) Overseas Version Security Target 3. SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION This chapter describes threats, organizational security policies and assumptions. 3.1. Threats There is no threat that the TOE assumes. 3.2. Organizational Security Policies Organizational security policies that the TOE must comply with are as follows.
  • Page 17: Security Objectives

    TASKalfa 3500i, TASKalfa 4500i, TASKalfa 5500i Data Security Kit (E) Overseas Version Security Target 4. SECURITY OBJECTIVES This chapter describes the security objectives for the TOE, the security objectives for the operational environment and the security objectives rationale. 4.1. Security Objectives for the TOE The security objectives for the TOE are described as follows: O.OVERWRITE: Overwrite-erase of the residue data...
  • Page 18: Table 4.1 Correspondences Between Organizational Security Policies And Assumptions

    TASKalfa 3500i, TASKalfa 4500i, TASKalfa 5500i Data Security Kit (E) Overseas Version Security Target Table 4.1 Correspondences between organizational security policies and assumptions, and security objectives Organizational security policies /Assumptions Security Objectives O.OVERWRITE O.ENCRYPT OE.LOCATION OE.NETWORK OE.CE “Table correspondences between...
  • Page 19 TASKalfa 3500i, TASKalfa 4500i, TASKalfa 5500i Data Security Kit (E) Overseas Version Security Target attack are limited, and A.LOCATION can be realized. A.NETWORK The assumption of A.NETWORK requires that the TOE is connected to the internal network protected from unauthorized access via the external network. The purpose...
  • Page 20: Extended Components Definition

    TASKalfa 3500i, TASKalfa 4500i, TASKalfa 5500i Data Security Kit (E) Overseas Version Security Target 5. EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION Extended components are not defined. © 2011 KYOCERA MITA Corporation...
  • Page 21: Security Requirements

    TASKalfa 3500i, TASKalfa 4500i, TASKalfa 5500i Data Security Kit (E) Overseas Version Security Target 6. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS This chapter describes the TOE security requirements. 6.1. TOE Security Functional Requirements FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation Hierarchical to: No other components Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]...
  • Page 22 TASKalfa 3500i, TASKalfa 4500i, TASKalfa 5500i Data Security Kit (E) Overseas Version Security Target FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation Hierarchical to: No other components Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]...
  • Page 23 TASKalfa 3500i, TASKalfa 4500i, TASKalfa 5500i Data Security Kit (E) Overseas Version Security Target FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection Hierarchical to: No other components Dependencies: No dependencies FDP_RIP.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is...
  • Page 24: Toe Security Assurance Requirements

    TASKalfa 3500i, TASKalfa 4500i, TASKalfa 5500i Data Security Kit (E) Overseas Version Security Target 6.2. TOE Security Assurance Requirements The evaluation assurance level of the TOE is EAL3. The security assurance requirement applied to the TOE is listed in Table 6.1.
  • Page 25: Dependent Relations Between Toe Security Functional Requirements

    FCS_COP.1, it is ensured that a cryptographic key enabling encryption is generated according to FCS_CKM.1. At this time, the cryptographic key is generated every time power is turned on, using the Kyocera Mita’s standard cryptographic key generation algorithm. Therefore O.ENCRYPT can ensure that the stored data shall not be illegally decoded.
  • Page 26: Rationale For Security Assurance Requirements

    TASKalfa 3500i, TASKalfa 4500i, TASKalfa 5500i Data Security Kit (E) Overseas Version Security Target Table 6.3 Dependent relations between TOE security functional requirements TOE Security Dependent Reference Functional Hierarchical Note Relations Requirements FCS. CKM.1 None FCS_COP.1 FCS_CKM.4 Not needed Refer to 6.3.2.1 FCS_COP.1...
  • Page 27: Toe Summary Specification

    The TOE generates a 128-bit cryptographic key to be used in the AES algorithm by using the Kyocera Mita’s standard cryptographic key generating algorithm. The key is generated based on an identical and unique number on the MFP basis, every time each MFP power is turned on, and is kept in a volatile memory.
  • Page 28: Overwrite-Erase Function

    TASKalfa 3500i, TASKalfa 4500i, TASKalfa 5500i Data Security Kit (E) Overseas Version Security Target the AES encryption algorithm. 7.2. Overwrite-erase Function TSF.OVERWRITE After process of the basic functions such as the copy function, the network scan function, the print function and the document management box function is completed, or after the cancellation made by cancel operation during these processing are completed, MFP deletes used image data in the HDD.
  • Page 29: Acronyms And Terminology

    TASKalfa 3500i, TASKalfa 4500i, TASKalfa 5500i Data Security Kit (E) Overseas Version Security Target 8. ACRONYMS AND TERMINOLOGY 8.1. Definitions of terms The definitions of the terms used in this ST are indicated in Table 8.1. Table 8.1 Definitions of terms used in this ST...
  • Page 30: Definitions Of Acronyms

    TASKalfa 3500i, TASKalfa 4500i, TASKalfa 5500i Data Security Kit (E) Overseas Version Security Target Overwrite-Erase This is to overwrite on the actual image data area with meaningless character strings when receiving instruction for deletion of the stored image data in the...

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Taskalfa 4500iTaskalfa 5500i

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