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Belkin® Secure DVI KVM Switch, Secure KM Switch and
Secure Windowing KVM EAL 4 augmented ALC_FLR.3 Security Target
4.3.2 Security Objectives Rationale for the Operational Environment
Threats, Policies, and
Assumptions
A.ACCESS
An AUTHORIZED USER
possesses the necessary
privileges to access the
information transferred
by the TOE. USERS are
AUTHORIZED USERS.
A.MANAGE
The TOE is installed and
managed in accordance
with the manufacturer's
directions.
A.NOEVIL
The AUTHORIZED USER is
non‐hostile and follows
all usage guidance.
A.PHYSICAL
The TOE is physically
secure.
Table 8 – Operational Environment Security Objectives rationale
2
The objective and rational here differs slightly from the PP because the TOE provides addition protections that
are attributed to the TOE environment in the PP. It should be also noted that although the operating environment
assumed to be physically secure, the TOE may be exposed to tampering while in transit to its operation site.
Summary
OE.ACCESS
The
AUTHORIZED
possess the necessary privileges to
access the information transferred
by the TOE. USERS are AUTHORIZED
USERS.
OE.MANAGE
The TOE shall be installed and
managed in accordance with the
manufacturer's directions.
OE.NOEVIL
The AUTHORIZED USER shall be
non‐hostile and follow all usage
guidance.
OE.PHYSICAL
The TOE shall be physically secure.
Objectives and rationale
All
authorized
trustworthy individuals, having
USER
shall
background
commensurate with the level of
data being protected, have
undergone appropriate training,
and follow all user guidance.
Restates the assumption.
Restates the assumption.
The TOE is assumed to be held in
a secure site protected from
physical attack (e.g., theft or
destruction)
could
intruders
environment, but it does not
include
actions that might be taken by an
individual that is authorized to
access the TOE environment.
Rev. 1.01
users
are
investigations
2
. Physical attack
include
unauthorized
into
the
TOE
physical
destructive
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