Organization - Belkin F1DN102C User Manual

Belkin® Secure DVI KVM Switch, Secure KM Switch and
Secure Windowing KVM EAL 4 augmented ALC_FLR.3 Security Target Rev. 1.01
be accepted by the TOE only if it is qualified. A non‐qualified (UNAUTHORIZED) USB device will
be blocked by the TOE and cannot be used. Protection from invalid USB devices is
accomplished as explained in more detail in Section 7 of this ST.
The TOE design uses read only non‐volatile memory components to prevent any possibility of a
remote tampering attack intended to modify TOE security functionality. Read Only Memory
protection is accomplished as explained in more detail in Section 7 of this ST.
1.4 Organization
Security Target Introduction (Section 1)
Section 1 provides identification of the TOE and ST, an overview of the TOE, an overview of the
content of the ST, document conventions, and relevant terminology. The introduction also
provides a description of the TOE security functions as well as the physical and logical
boundaries for the TOE, the hardware and software that make up the TOE, and the physical and
logical boundaries of the TOE.
Conformance Claims (Section 2)
Section 2 provides applicable Common Criteria (CC) conformance claims, Protection Profile (PP)
conformance claims and Assurance Package conformance claims.
Security Problem Definition (Section 3)
Section 3 describes the threats, organizational security policies, and assumptions pertaining to
the TOE and the TOE environment.
Security Objectives (Section 4)
Section 4 identifies the security objectives for the TOE and its supporting environment as well
as a rationale describing how objectives are sufficient to counter the threats identified for the
TOE.
Extended Components Definition (Section 5)
Section 5 presents the components needed for the ST but not present in Part II or Part III of the
Common Criteria Standard.
Security Requirements (Section 6)
Page | 17