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Belkin Secure DVI-I Manual

Belkin Secure DVI-I Manual

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Security Target EAL2 augmented ALC_FLR.3
Release Date:
Document ID:
Version:
Prepared By:
Prepared For:
Belkin
Secure DVI-I
®

KVM Switch

February 28, 2013
11-2098-R-0001
1.2
InfoGard Laboratories, Inc.
Belkin International, Inc.
12045 E. Waterfront Drive
Playa Vista, CA 90094

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Summary of Contents for Belkin Secure DVI-I

  • Page 1: Kvm Switch

    Belkin Secure DVI-I ® KVM Switch Security Target EAL2 augmented ALC_FLR.3 Release Date: February 28, 2013 Document ID: 11-2098-R-0001 Version: Prepared By: InfoGard Laboratories, Inc. Prepared For: Belkin International, Inc. 12045 E. Waterfront Drive Playa Vista, CA 90094...

  • Page 2: Table Of Contents

    ECURITY EQUIREMENT EPENDENCIES     ..........................31 EPENDENCIES     ........................ 31 ECURITY SSURANCE EASURES     ......................32 ATIONALE FOR ECURITY SSURANCE     TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION ......................33 © 2011 Belkin International, Inc. and InfoGard Laboratories, Inc. ®...

  • Page 3: List Of Tables

    Table 7: SFR and Security Objectives Mapping................28   Table 8 - Objective to SFRs Rationale ..................30   Table 9: SFR Dependencies ......................31   Table 10: Security Assurance Measures ..................32   © 2011 Belkin International, Inc. and InfoGard Laboratories, Inc. ®...

  • Page 4: Introduction And Description

    <or> Belkin Secure 4-port DVI-I Dual-Head KVM w/audio Part Number F1DN104E <or> Belkin Secure 4-port DVI-I Dual-Head KVM w/audio Plus Part Number F1DN104F <or> Secure 8-port Single-head DVI-I (Dual Link) KVM w/ audio and user authentication port Part Number F1DN108C <or>...

  • Page 5: Overview And Logical Scope

    The Belkin® Secure KVM (referred to as the TOE in this document) supports one method of user interaction. The front panel of the TOE supports manual push-button selections to invoke the functions of the TOE.

  • Page 6: Document Terminology

    DEVICE, operator into positioning information on a . Examples of MONITOR Pointing Devices include a mouse, trackball, joystick, and touchpad. Peripheral Port Group (“Group”)/ Peripheral Port Group ID © 2011 Belkin International, Inc. and InfoGard Laboratories, Inc. ®...
  • Page 7 COMPUTER INPUT or of receiving or both. The term COMPUTER OUTPUT PERIPHERAL sometimes used as a synonym for device or any unit. INPUT OUTPUT Attribute (See Peripheral Port Group ID) © 2011 Belkin International, Inc. and InfoGard Laboratories, Inc. ®...

  • Page 8: Acronyms

    Light-Emitting Diode Mandatory Access Control Protection Profile Peripheral Sharing Switch Security Function Policy Security Target Target of Evaluation TSF Scope of Control TOE Security Functions TOE Security Policy Video Display Terminal © 2011 Belkin International, Inc. and InfoGard Laboratories, Inc. ®...

  • Page 9: Protection Profile Overview

    This section lists the hardware and software components of the product and denotes which are in the TOE and which are in the environment. 1.7.1 Evaluated Environment This table identifies hardware components and indicates whether or not each component is in the TOE. © 2011 Belkin International, Inc. and InfoGard Laboratories, Inc. ®...
  • Page 10 Secure DVI KVM Switch Security Target ® TOE or Component Description Environment Belkin Secure 2-port DVI-I KVM w/audio Part Number F1DN102B Hardware <or> Belkin Secure 4-port DVI-I KVM w/audio Part Number F1DN104B <or> Belkin Secure 2-port DVI-I KVM w/audio Plus Part Number F1DN102C <or>...
  • Page 11 Dell Ultra sharp E190S, 19” , Analog and Digital connections Dell Ultra sharp E228WFP, Analog and Digital connections Samsung 2343BWX 23” , Analog and Digital connections Samsung SyncMaster 712n Analog only monitor Environment Belkin DVI/USB KVM Cables (as needed): Cables for connection of Host Description...

  • Page 12: Guidance Documents

    This section identifies any items that are specifically excluded from the TOE.  CAC switching or User Authentication device switching o A tamper label will be applied to the CAC port during manufacturing, and © 2011 Belkin International, Inc. and InfoGard Laboratories, Inc. ®...
  • Page 13 Secure DVI KVM Switch Security Target ® removal will not be allowed per guidance.  DCU (Desktop Controller Unit or Remote Control) o The use of the optional DCU is not allowed per guidance. © 2011 Belkin International, Inc. and InfoGard Laboratories, Inc. ®...

  • Page 14: Conformance Claims

    Human Interface Devices. Assurance Level: EAL 2 augmented with ALC_FLR.2 PP Version: 2.1, 7 September 2010. As a result, the Security Target directly uses text from this Protection Profile. The ALC_FLR.2 requirement of the PP is met through ALC_FLR.3 conformance. © 2011 Belkin International, Inc. and InfoGard Laboratories, Inc. ®...

  • Page 15: Security Problem Definition

    T.TRANSFER , via the TOE, between may allow information CONNECTION COMPUTERS transfer. T.PHYSICAL The TOE may be physically tampered or modified, allowing unauthorized information flows. © 2011 Belkin International, Inc. and InfoGard Laboratories, Inc. ®...

  • Page 16: Organizational Security Policies

    Belkin Secure DVI KVM Switch Security Target ® 3.3 Organizational Security Policies There are no Organizational Security Policies for this TOE. © 2011 Belkin International, Inc. and InfoGard Laboratories, Inc. ®...

  • Page 17: Security Objectives

    The TOE shall detect any USB connection that is not a pointing device, keyboard, or display and will perform no interaction with that device after the initial identification. The TOE does not allow USB displays. © 2011 Belkin International, Inc. and InfoGard Laboratories, Inc. ®...

  • Page 18: Security Objectives For The Operational Environment

    Table 3: Operational Environment Security Objectives 4.3 Mapping of Security Environment to Security Objectives The following table represents a mapping of the threats and assumptions to the security objectives defined in this ST. © 2011 Belkin International, Inc. and InfoGard Laboratories, Inc. ®...

  • Page 19: Security Objectives Rationale

    COMPUTER CONNECTION transfer of information from shall not be accessible by any one to the other. This is other PERIPHERAL GROUP particularly important for The TOE does not allow USB displays. © 2011 Belkin International, Inc. and InfoGard Laboratories, Inc. ®...
  • Page 20 (stored compromise of the in the ROM) will remain data flowing through unchanged. the TOE. © 2011 Belkin International, Inc. and InfoGard Laboratories, Inc. ®...
  • Page 21 COMPUTER system to another, resulting in compromise of sensitive information. An example of this is transfer via the buffering mechanism in many © 2011 Belkin International, Inc. and InfoGard Laboratories, Inc. ®...
  • Page 22 TSF's TSF. information flows. devices or TSF's enclosure has occurred. © 2011 Belkin International, Inc. and InfoGard Laboratories, Inc. ®...

  • Page 23: Security Objectives Rationale For The Operational Environment

    TOE environment. 4.6 Rationale For Organizational Policy Coverage There are no Organizational Policies for this TOE. © 2011 Belkin International, Inc. and InfoGard Laboratories, Inc. ®...

  • Page 24: Extended Components Definition

    All USB devices connected to the Peripheral switch shall be interrogated to ensure that they are valid (pointing device, keyboard, display ). No The TOE does not allow USB displays. © 2011 Belkin International, Inc. and InfoGard Laboratories, Inc. ®...

  • Page 25: Ext_Rom.1 Read-Only Roms

    TSF software embedded in TSF ROMs must be contained in mask- programmed or one-time-programmable read-only memory permanently attached (non-socketed) to a circuit assembly. 5.3 Rationale for Explicitly Stated Security Requirements These Explicit SFRs are from the applicable Protection Profile. © 2011 Belkin International, Inc. and InfoGard Laboratories, Inc. ®...

  • Page 26: Security Requirements

    PERIPHERAL DATA and STATE INFORMATION (OBJECTS), PERIPHERAL PORT GROUP IDs (ATTRIBUTES). FDP_IFF.1.2 The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and controlled information via a controlled operation if the following rules hold: © 2011 Belkin International, Inc. and InfoGard Laboratories, Inc. ®...

  • Page 27: Security Management (Fmt)

    Application Note: On start-up, one and only one attached COMPUTER shall be selected. FMT_MSA.3.2 The TSF shall allow the None to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created. © 2011 Belkin International, Inc. and InfoGard Laboratories, Inc. ®...

  • Page 28: Protection Of The Tsf (Fpt)

    Objectives and describes the applicable rationale based on direct reference from the applicable Protection Profile. 6.2.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements Tracing & Rationale FDP_IFC.1 FDP_IFF.1 FMT_MSA.1 FMT_MSA.3 FPT_PHP.1 EXT_ROM.1 EXT_VIR.1 EXT_IUC.1 Table 7: SFR and Security Objectives Mapping © 2011 Belkin International, Inc. and InfoGard Laboratories, Inc. ®...
  • Page 29 COMPUTER to which the Attribute Initialization) requirement is a dependency of shared set of PERIPHERAL FMT_MSA.3. DEVICES is FMT_MSA.3: The TOE CONNECTED. Single push assumes a default PERIPHERAL button, multiple push button, © 2011 Belkin International, Inc. and InfoGard Laboratories, Inc. ®...

  • Page 30: Rationale For It Security Requirement Dependencies

    This section includes a table of all the security functional requirements and their dependencies and a rationale for any dependencies that are not satisfied. The TOE does not allow USB displays. © 2011 Belkin International, Inc. and InfoGard Laboratories, Inc. ®...

  • Page 31: Dependencies Not Met

    TOE. Evaluation activities of the Security Target are not included, as they are performed before officially entering evaluation. © 2011 Belkin International, Inc. and InfoGard Laboratories, Inc. ®...

  • Page 32: Rationale For Security Assurance

    The assurance security requirements for this Security Target are taken from Part 3 of the CC. These assurance requirements compose an Evaluation Assurance Level 2 as defined by the CC. © 2011 Belkin International, Inc. and InfoGard Laboratories, Inc. ®...

  • Page 33: Toe Summary Specification

    PORT GROUP ID. Once the COMPTER has been selected, an LED adjacent to the button selected will illuminate. This LED remains illuminated while the connection is maintained. Once the user selects another COMPUTER (by depressing a different button), the original LED © 2011 Belkin International, Inc. and InfoGard Laboratories, Inc. ®...

  • Page 34: Usb Connection (Ext_Iuc)

    These protections are not able to be bypassed without having physical access to the system board. The anti-tamper system described in section 7.3 assures that undetected internal access is not possible. © 2011 Belkin International, Inc. and InfoGard Laboratories, Inc. ®...

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